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Abstract
Background: The risk preferences of individuals have an important role
in many decisions under uncertainty. Buying insurance is a choice made
under uncertain future outcomes. A community-based health insurance
(CBHI) scheme has the primary objectives of reducing the health and fi-
nancial risks related to unexpected catastrophic healthcare expenditures. It
is assumed that the more risk-averse or loss-averse that individuals are, the
more likely they are to favor the insurance.
Objective: This paper examines the association of rural and self-employed
households likelihood of purchasing the CBHI scheme with their own risk
preferences (risk aversions for gains and probability prospects, and loss aver-
sion), which are revealed by the field experiment in the rural villages of
Savannakhet Province, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR).
Method: To attain this objective, first a structured questionnaire-based
household survey is employed to collect 580 rural and self-employed house-
holds objective data. Moreover, an incentive compatible lottery choice field
experiment (Tanaka et al, 2010) is conducted to assess their risk prefer-
ences, which allows us to test the validity of the expected utility theory
(EUT) and prospect theory (PT) assumptions simultaneously. Second, pro-
bit regressions are applied to examine the associations between their CBHI
participation and their risk preferences by controlling their demographic and
economic backgrounds.
Results: The findings of our study show that the probability of a house-
hold’s decision to enroll in the CBHI scheme is independent of the risk
aversion towards gains but is significantly associated with the risk aversion
towards probability prospects. A weak correlation between loss aversion and
the choice to participate the scheme is found when CBHI ex-members are ex-
cluded and more demographic and economic related variables are controlled
in the regression.
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1 Introduction
In low income countries, the poor often suffer from high rates of illness
due to the low standards of living (Orach, 2009). As a matter of fact, the
poor are the most vulnerable group, especially for high exposure to risks and
low access to sufficient healthcare services. Additionally, ill health reduces
work productivity, which leads to lost income. To reduce this vulnerability,
the community-based health insurance (CBHI) scheme is considered one of
the most powerful mechanisms to reduce both the health risks and finan-
cial risks caused by catastrophic healthcare expenditures expenditures for
informally employed people, who are mainly lower-income people.
Although the CBHI scheme has an obvious objective to reduce health
and financial risks for the poor, the progress of its actual implementation
is very slow, especially in low-income countries. According to an extensive
body of empirical work, the four common problems of the CBHI scheme’s
implementation are low enrollment rates (see, for instance, Basaza et al.,
2008; Odeyemi, 2014), adverse selection (Carrin, 2003; Wang et al., 2006;
Parmar et al., 2012; Duku et al., 2016), poor quality of healthcare (Delaval-
lade, 2017), and high drop-out rates (Dong et al., 2009; Mebratie et al.,
2015; Panda, 2016).
Especially, the low enrollment problem of the CBHI scheme is con-
sidered both a primary challenge facing the financial sustainability of the
scheme and an indicator of low acceptance of the scheme (Wiesmann & Jut-
ting, 2000). The literature often reports disappointing enrollment percent-
ages, with the percentage of the eligible population covered varying between
1% and 10% (De Allegri et al., 2006; Soors et al., 2010; Alkenbrack & Lin-
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delow, 2013; Odeyemi, 2014) for most cases; and rarely it is between 21%
and 46% (Panda et al., 2014; Ozawa et al., 2016). Extensive empirical works
highlighted some exogenous drivers and obstacles to the CBHI scheme’s up-
take decisions (see, for example, Kyomugisha et al., 2009; Odeyemi & Nixon,
2013; Parmar et al, 2012; Dhillon et al., 2012). However, the findings are
varied for different case studies and scheme settings. Apart from exogenous
factors, can individual-specific preferences describe their decisions to opt for
the CBHI scheme?
As suggested in the literature, risk preferences are of fundamental
importance for individual heterogeneity (Dave et al., 2010) and are found
to have a significant role in most important settings. The empirical corre-
lation between risk preferences and economic behaviors under uncertainty
is well-documented in a growing number of studies, such as those on mi-
gration (Jaeger et al., 2010; Bauernschuster et al., 2014), higher education
enrollment (Breen et al., 2014; Heckman & Montalto, 2016), occupational
decisions (Cramer et al., 2002; Bonin et al., 2007; Ahn, 2010; Ekelund et
al., 2005; Batista, 2014), and technology adoption (Liu, 2013; Qiu et al.,
2014). In the research on risky health-related behaviors, several studies have
shown that risk preferences are likely to shape the likelihood that a subject
engaged in cigarette smoking, drinking alcohol, becoming obese, seat belt
non-use while driving, and failing to have insurance (Barsky et al., 1997;
Anderson & Mellor, 2008; Pfeifer, 2012).
Since the main purpose of health insurance is to reduce financial
and health risks, the more risk-averse individuals are more likely to pur-
chase insurance. There are some studies investigating the links between risk
preferences and the likelihood of insurance uptake. For instance, Lammers
and Warmerdam (2010) use standard lottery questions with hypothetical re-
wards to measure the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of individuals,
which is a measure under EUT. Furthermore, Pierre and Jusot (2017) apply
a self-reported questionnaire with 11-point scales to measure self-perceived
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risks. Both studies find that the likelihood of health insurance uptake is sig-
nificantly related with individual risk preference variations. However, both
Lammers and Warmerdam (2010) and Pierre and Jusot (2017) elicit indi-
vidual risk preferences with no monetary incentives. Glaeser et al. (2000)
suggests that self-reported attitudes do not always indicate subjects’ real
attitudes.
To measure more realistic risk preferences, some studies conducted
experiments with real money at stake. The study of Alkenbrack and Linde-
low (2015) is particularly relevant to this paper as it examines the correla-
tion between individual risk aversion and the CBHI enrollment in urban and
semi-urban Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR). Risk preferences are
measured based on the EUT assumption. Household heads encounter with
five repeated gambles in which they choose a hand that they think having
money. The stake is increasingly heterogeneous starting from “risk free”
until the “all or nothing” risk. Another closely related preceding work to
the present study is that of Ito and Kono (2010), which assesses the reasons
why the uptake of the Yeshasvini microinsurance scheme in India remains
so low by focusing on the risk preference parameters of PT. The experiment
is designed so that there are equal probabilities of obtaining either a bet-
ter or worse outcome (the risk aversion for probability prospects cannot be
observed). The risk parameters are defined as categorical dummies based
on switching points that respondents make accordingly. Despite different
theories of prior assumptions, no clear evidence results from the two studies
on the relationship between risk preferences and health insurance adoption
decisions. Overall, the existing evidence regarding whether individual risk
preferences predict individual decisions to buy insurance is rather mixed.
Therefore, this study aims to examine the association of households’
risk preferences on their decisions to participate in the CBHI scheme in rural
villages of Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR with three main contributions
to the literature. First, we conduct a field experiment to elicit parameters
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of risk preferences with real money rewards. Second, we measure not only
the parameters of risk aversion for gains and loss aversion but also risk aver-
sion for subjective probability prospects (which is omitted in the literature).
Third, unlike many preceding studies, experimental data allows us to test
the validity of either the or PT assumption1 simultaneously without a prior
assumption.
To attain the objective, we employ the risk elicitation experiment
technique of Tanaka et al. (2010). The experiment is designed in a way
that is more realistic with varied probabilities of winning better or worse
outcomes. Despite an increasing application of this technique in a variety of
contexts (Nguyen & Leung, 2010; Liu, 2013; Liu & Huang, 2013; Liebenehm
& Waibel, 2014), there are still scarce applications in the health insurance
setting, especially with respect to the voluntary CBHI scheme.
We select the CBHI scheme in Lao PDR as a case study because of
its chronically low enrollment. According to Sydavong and Goto (2018), ev-
idence shows that the CBHI scheme has indirect positive impacts on the rice
production and cow holdings of enrolled households in rural villages of Lao
PDR. Thus, to promote greater enrollment, it is necessary to analyze several
dimensions of factors that lead to an increased likelihood of the scheme’s up-
take, including both exogenous and behavior determinants. The remaining
sections of this paper are structured as follows. Section two introduces the
background of the CBHI scheme in Lao PDR. The next section details the
experimental procedures, the estimation model, the data sampling, and the
characteristics of the samples. The results are discussed in section four and
the conclusions in section five.
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2 CBHI scheme in Lao PDR
In Lao PDR, health risk is expected to be an increasing threat to the
poor, especially in remote areas (World Health Organization, 2012) where
the majority of the population remains dependent on agricultural activities
for subsistence and the infrastructure is inadequate. Therefore, the govern-
ment is concerned with strengthening the health system health financing
schemes in particular to ensure health equity for all groups in the popula-
tion.
To improve the health system, the government launched four health
financing schemes targeting specific groups in the population, including
State Authority Social Security (SASS) for government workers, Social Secu-
rity Organization (SSO) for salaried private and state-owned enterprises em-
ployees, Health Equity Funds (HEFs) for the extreme poor, and Community-
Based Health Insurance (CBHI) for non-poor workers in the informal sector
(Ahmed et al., 2013). Among the four schemes, only the CBHI scheme is
based on voluntary membership and decentralized implementation.
As of 2014, only 27.2% of the population was covered by any scheme
of the health financing system. Moreover, the decomposed coverage by
scheme is rather heterogeneous. While the coverage of the SASS and HEF
schemes, which targeted nearly 26.5% of the Lao population, achieved ap-
proximately 85% of their target, that of the HEFs and CBHI schemes made
little progress, with only 6.4% of the targeted group enrolled. In particular,
the CBHI scheme, which targets approximately two-thirds of the Lao pop-
ulation, achieved only 3.7% of the target by 2014 (National Health Bureau,
2014). In other words, the CBHI scheme has the largest target but the
lowest achievement. Therefore, this study intentionally evaluates the CBHI
scheme for three main reasons: 1. the scheme is voluntary, 2. the targeted
population is mainly the poor in rural areas with limited infrastructure and
geographic constraints, and 3. the scheme has made extremely slow progress
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towards the given target.
In 2002, the Ministry of Health (MOH) introduced the CBHI scheme
as a pilot project in two districts with technical assistance from the WHO
and financial support from the United Nations Human Security Fund. As of
September 2015, the scheme was available in 50 of the 148 districts in 17 of
the 18 provinces, which is equivalent to 2,271 of the 8,507 villages. The total
number of beneficiaries was reported as 33,795 households (179,534 people).
Currently, the benefit package of the CBHI scheme covers outpatient and
inpatient services, including primary health care, specialist services, diag-
nostic tests, and prescribed pharmaceuticals that are available in hospitals.
The household is the unit of enrollment, and the premiums vary depending
on urban or rural residence and the number of household members. The
premium rates have not been updated since 2005 (World Bank, 2010). The
window period of service access is three months upon enrollment. With the
gatekeeping system, CBHI members have to first seek services at contracting
facilities, such as dispensaries and district hospitals, and only referral pa-
tients are sent to provincial or regional hospitals (Annear et al., 2011). Since
2012, 50% of the schemes revenue has come from premium collection, and
the other 50% has come from government subsidization (Lao Government,
2012).
3 Methodology
3.1 Measurement of risk parameters
Tanaka et al. (2010) incorporated prospect theory2 as an alterna-
tive theoretical framework to EUT in the experiment. PT presumes that
individuals behave in a risk-averse manner for gains but are risk-seeking for
losses. The real power of this methodology is evident in ways that, unlike
EUT in which the risk preference depends solely on the gains, the risk pref-
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erences of PT are based on the gains, the losses and probability prospects.
Therefore, researchers can simultaneously elicit three parameters concern-
ing risk preferences: risk aversion, subjective probability weighting and loss
aversion (Tversky & Kahneman; 1992). More importantly, EUT, which is
treated as a special case of PT, can be examined in the same experiment.
That is, the methodology of Tanaka et al. (2010) enables researchers to
statistically test the null hypothesis of the EUT. In PT, risk attitudes are
jointly defined by two functions, including a value function of outcomes that
explains the attitude towards outcomes (or the subjects valuation of money)
and a subjective probability weighting function describing the subjects at-
titude towards probabilities. Decision making under risk can be viewed as
a preference for either prospects or gambles. A utility function according to
Tanaka et al. (2010) has the form as follows:
U (x, p; y, q) =
{
v (y) + pi (p) (v (x)− v (y)) , x > y > 0 or x < y < 0
v (y) + pi (p) v (x) + pi (q) v (y) , x < 0 < y
where v (x) =
{
xσ , for x > 0
−λ (−xσ) , for x < 0
and pi (p) = 1
exp
[
ln
(
1
p
)]α
where v (0) = 0, pi (0) = 0, and pi (1) = 1. U (x, p; y, q) denotes for
the expected value of binary prospects. x and y are the outcomes with
the corresponding probabilities p and q, respectively. v (x) is the power
value function defined by the outcomes, while pi (p) is the weighting function
defined by the probabilities. σ captures the concavity of the value function,
which is known as risk aversion3. λ illustrates the curvature of below zero
compared to that of above zero, which is also stated as the degree of loss
aversion (losses are weighed more heavily than gains). Notice that the higher
the λ, the more loss aversion that exists4. α is the parameter to identify
the shape of the probability weighting function5. Note that for the special
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case where pi (p) = p for all p resulting from α = 1 and λ = 1, the
prospect value function would transform to the traditional EUT6. Due to
the aforementioned advantages, the utility function of PT is employed in
place of the EUT and probability weighting pi (p) is employed in lieu of p.
The loss aversion parameter λ is jointly constructed based on the utility
curvature σ and switching point in series 3. Since series 3 of the experiment
is designed given equal probability between option A and B, the probability
weighting function is ignored.
3.2 Field experiment
As Weber et al. (2002) found that the degree of risk taking of in-
dividuals is highly domain-specific, in the present study, it is crucial to
assume invariant risk preferences of individuals over time and across deci-
sion contexts. Indeed, observing risk preferences of all household members
is far beyond our limits due to experimental complexity and budgetary con-
straints. Thus, we again assume that the risk preferences of the respondents
are an applicable proxy for the entire household’s preferences7. Addition-
ally, we assume that the probability weighting in the scope of this study
is interpreted as the probability of financial losses due to health care seek-
ing8. This study is based on the risk elicitation experiment of Tanaka et al.
(2010) that uses a set of two-outcome prospects with monetary outcomes9.
The lottery choice experiment is implemented to elicit the parameters of
risk aversion, probability weighting and loss aversion of rural dwellers in
Savannakhet Province. Our team paid significant effort to collecting the
high-quality data. Accordingly, a paper-based method is used in place of a
computer-based experiment for better comprehension of the subjects.
As is customary, to identify the household characteristics, each sub-
ject is asked a series of questions on socio-economic indicators prior to the
experimental session, including their demographic details, household assets,
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microfinance history, CBHI experience, income and expenditure sources,
and self-reported illness history in the 12 months preceding the survey. An
investigator then distributes a sample sheet and explains the instructions to
every single subject separately as follows.
• The subjects can either choose option A or option B in all cases. How-
ever, those who start off by choosing option A can switch over to option
B at some point, but no double switches are allowed over each series10.
In contrast, the subject who selects option B in the beginning cannot
switch in reverse to option A, given that it is a logically coherent de-
cision
• After all subjects complete the given 35 decision rows, each respondent
draws one of 35 numbered balls from a box to determine a decision
row at random and does the same from another box of 10 numbered
balls to decide the real moneytary reward. The mechanism is that
each subject earns the actual money11 based jointly on the outcome
of the lots and the choices that the respondent makes12.
Table 1 displays the full set of pairwise lottery choices used in the
experiment and the expected payoff difference in the rightmost column13.
According to Tanaka et al. (2010), the experiment is categorized into 3
series of gains and losses. The choices are ranked in order of increasing
payoffs. Each subject is confronted with a series of 35 paired choices, as
shown in Table 1, but not the expected payoff difference. Subjects are asked
to indicate a preference for either option A or option B in each decision row
sequentially. Option A is relatively a safe choice, whereas option B has a
higher expected payoff and variance. Note, however, that a higher prize can
be earned at the cost of a lower probability for both options. The probability
of gambles remains unchanged across series. Only the amount at stake in
option B varies in each decision row of series 1 and 2 in which the probability
of winning the higher prize in option A is relatively superior to that of
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option B. For instance, option A has the a 3/10 chance to win 20,000LAK
and a 7/10 chance to win 5,000LAK with certainty across series 1, whereas
option B has relatively higher stakes but a higher variance of probability
that ranged between 2,500LAK and 850,000LAK. Theoretically, only those
who are very risk-seeking would choose option B from the beginning, or vice
versa. Unlike the first two series, the value of both options systematically
varies in series 3.
The range of risk parameters is defined such that the subjects make
the switching points following the models in Tanaka et al. (2010). The
model is constructed by the manner in which the choices in series 1 and 2
of each subject are incorporated to measure the risk aversion parameters
(σ and α), and only the parameter of curvature utility function (σ) is then
combined with the subjects choice in series 3 to determine the intervals of
loss aversion (λ). However, Tanaka et al. (2010) provides the tables of the
approximate values of σ and α, and the experimental data in the present
study refers to the point values in those tables14.
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Table 1: Risk experiment sheet
Option A Option B Expected payoff difference
Series 1
Probability 3/10 7/10 1/10 9/10
1 20,000 5,000 34,000 2,500 3,850
2 20,000 5,000 37,500 2,500 3,500
3 20,000 5,000 41,500 2,500 3,100
4 20,000 5,000 46,500 2,500 2,600
5 20,000 5,000 53,000 2,500 1,950
6 20,000 5,000 62,500 2,500 1,000
7 20,000 5,000 75,000 2,500 -250
8 20,000 5,000 92,500 2,500 -2,000
9 20,000 5,000 110,000 2,500 -3,750
10 20,000 5,000 150,000 2,500 -7,750
11 20,000 5,000 200,000 2,500 -12,750
12 20,000 5,000 300,000 2,500 -22,750
13 20,000 5,000 500,000 2,500 -42,750
14 20,000 5,000 850,000 2,500 -77,750
Series 2
9/10 1/10 7/10 3/10
1 20,000 15,000 27,000 2,500 -150
2 20,000 15,000 28,000 2,500 -850
3 20,000 15,000 29,000 2,500 -1,550
4 20,000 15,000 30,000 2,500 -2,250
5 20,000 15,000 31,000 2,500 -2,950
6 20,000 15,000 32,500 2,500 -4,000
7 20,000 15,000 34,000 2,500 -5,050
8 20,000 15,000 36,000 2,500 -6,450
9 20,000 15,000 38,500 2,500 -8,200
10 20,000 15,000 41,500 2,500 -10,300
11 20,000 15,000 45,000 2,500 -12,750
12 20,000 15,000 50,000 2,500 -16,250
13 20,000 15,000 55,000 2,500 -19,750
14 20,000 15,000 65,000 2,500 -26,750
Series 3
5/10 5/10 5/10 5/10
1 12,500 -2,000 15,000 -10,500 3,000
2 2,000 -2,000 15,000 -10,500 -2,250
3 500 -2,000 15,000 -10,500 -3,000
4 500 -2,000 15,000 -8,000 -4,250
5 500 -4,000 15,000 -8,000 -5,250
6 500 -4,000 15,000 -7,000 -5,750
7 500 -4,000 15,000 -5,500 -6,500
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3.3 Estimation model of CBHI enrollment
In this study, we estimate the likelihood of CBHI scheme adoption de-
cisions by combining household demographic information and experimental
data. In the empirical approximation, we initially run the probit regression
with risk parameters and then consider the extension of including households
demographics and characteristics to examine the sensitivity of the estimates.
The distance to the district hospital is added in the regression as a general
control for the village’s infrastructure. In practice, the following model is
estimated as follows:
CBHIi = β0 + β1
′RPi + β2′SESi + εi (1)
where CBHIi takes value of 1 if respondent i (representing the house-
hold) is a member of the CBHI scheme and 0 otherwise15. RPi is the vector
of risk parameters and SESi is the vector of socio-economic variables (house-
hold head gender, household head age, household head education, household
size, agriculture area, and distance from village to district hospital). εi is
the error term.
Because only an interval of λ is measured by the experiment, following
Liu (2013), the midpoint of the interval is used as the point estimate in the
regression. For the elicited λ with a single bound either lower or upper
resulting from selecting all option A or option B, we treat the observed
bound as the point estimate.
3.4 Data sampling
This study collects the data of rural households in Savannakhet Province,
which is located in the center of Lao PDR. The province has the largest land
area and population size. According to the Center National Health Insur-
ance (NHI) Bureau’s report, in 2015, Savannakhet Province had the largest
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and most fluctuating number of CBHI members of all the provinces. For the
sample selection in this study, districts and villages are chosen purposely, but
representative households are randomly sampled according to the following
reasons.
• There are 15 districts in Savannakhet Province. Since 2014, eight of
the districts have reported increasing numbers of CBHI-enrolled house-
holds, while the remaining districts have faced a decreasing number
of CBHI members over time. Note that the provincial capital dis-
trict needs to be removed from our selection because its infrastructure
differs from that of the other districts. To ensure that the results
will account for the views of heterogeneous respondents, we intention-
ally select two representative districts with increasing and decreasing
numbers of CBHI members. Accordingly, we choose Champhone and
Xaibouly Districts, which have the largest coverage of CBHI among
increasing and decreasing districts16 for this study.
• As our focus is households in remote areas, to ensure that the experi-
ment can plausibly be conducted in these areas, we purposively desig-
nate only type II villages with a homogeneous infrastructure surveil-
lance of “1 1 0 1 1 1 0”17. Finally, we identify three villages in
Champhone District and six villages in Xaibouly District. However,
one village in Xaibouly District is removed due to accessibility con-
straints.
• All informal-sector households that are the targets of the CBHI scheme,
are eligible for this study. However, in practice, we purposely omit
monks because interviews with them are implausible. The eligible
population is stratified into three groups: CBHI active members, non-
members, and ex-members. Member respondents are randomly drawn
from a list of currently active CBHI members in each village, whereas
ex-members are randomly selected from a list of those who dropped out
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before August 2016. Non-members are randomly selected from a list of
households in each village, which excludes households that work in for-
mal sectors (employed households), member households and dropout
households18. Finally, there are 580 stratified random samples19 that
represent 46% of the eligible population. Our samples comprise 210
(36%), 72 (13%), and 298 (51%) active members, ex-members, and
non-members, respectively.
As is customary, we visit the chief of each village a few days be-
forehand to inform him of the objectives and tentative procedures of the
experiment. Once the list of random respondents is recruited, a day prior
to the experiment, the village chief announces the names of assigned house-
hold members to show up with the family book and CBHI member card
(if his/her household enrolls CBHI scheme) at the given location (usually
at temples). For convenience, every 6 respondents are appointed one-hour
intervals from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
3.5 Descriptive statistics
The questionnaire-based interview and risk experiment are conducted
for the sample of 580 households. Like the results of Tanaka et al. (2010), our
samples make rather few switches from option A to option B across all three
series, thus suggesting a considerable amount of heterogeneous distribution
of risk preferences. Only 27.2%, 22.6%, and 35% of subjects make switching
points in series 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A large portion of the respondents
prefer option B from the first decision row in all series. Across this lottery
choice experiment, the total reward is approximately 22,247LAK earning
per respondent, and ranges from -10,500LAK to 500,000LAK20.
The characteristics and measured risk parameters of the pool samples
and subsamples conditioned to the CBHI status are summarized in Table 2.
The mean difference tests are performed to examine whether significantly
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systematic variations of behavioral predictors and other characteristic con-
founders exist across subgroups. We compare the characteristics of our sam-
ples with those of rural samples from the Lao expenditure and consumption
survey, 2012-2013 (LECS V). Overall, our samples tend to be poorer, elderly,
less educated and have larger household sizes. This outcome is unsurpris-
ing for the reason that only rural households of the informal sector are the
eligible population of our study.
On average, the household heads of samples hold just four years of
schooling/education. Additionally, the distribution of the last 12 months
income is right-skewed, and of these, 61% report incomes below the poverty
line. Interestingly, many of the mean tests indicate significantly systematic
distributions of the observed variables across subsamples. For instance, the
heads of member households are likely to be elderly and better educated.
The test still presents substantial differences with respect to household sizes
and distance to the nearest hospital among subsamples.
Compared to the risk preferences of Vietnamese villagers in Tanaka et
al. (2010), the experimental data suggests that the majority of self-employed
individuals in Lao PDR tend to be less risk-averse in gains and less loss-
averse. However, the mean value of the risk-aversion in small-probability
prospects in losses is close to that of the Vietnamese villagers. The mean
test exhibits an undifferentiated risk aversion in gains among subgroups. It
is evident that the degree of risk aversion towards probability aspects in
losses is considerably heterogeneous, especially among members and non-
members. Hence, it is of use to question whether the risk preferences and
decisions that involve risk in our samples move in relation to each other.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables LECS V Full sample Subsample Mean difference test
Total rural SVK rurala M EN N E M-EN M-N M-E
(3,616) (369) 580 (210) (370) (298) (72)
σ (risk aversion for 0.88 0.9 0.86 0.89 0.75 0.04 0.01 0.15**
gains [0.58] [0.57] [0.59] [0.58] [0.60]
α (risk aversion for 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.7 0.05 0.05* 0.05
probability prospects) [0.34] [0.34] [0.33] [0.33] [0.33]
λ (loss aversion)b 2.28 2.21 2.33 2.31 2.43 n.a n.a n.a
Household head gender 0.95 0.93 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 -0.013 -0.001 -0.009
(1=male) [0.22] [0.25] [0.36] [0.37] [0.36] [0.36] [0.36]
Household head age 45.89 48.54 50.14 51.4 49.42 48.91 51.53 1.98* 2.92** -0.12
[12.52] [11.68] [13.42] [12.44] [13.92] [13.84] [14.12]
Household head 6.05 6.46 4.47 5.06 4.13 3.91 5.03 0.93*** 1.16*** 0.03
education [3.50] [3.68] [3.87] [3.63] [3.97] [3.91] [4.12]
Household size 5.45 5.49 5.92 6.37 5.67 5.62 5.88 0.7*** 0.75*** 0.50**
[2.22] [2.06] [2.16] [2.29] [2.03] [2.07] [1.87]
Agriculture area (m2) 17,809 17,871 17.774 18,506 14,745 96.11 -635.8 3,125.50
[22,029] [20,651] [22,802] [24,438] [13,867]
Distance to district 15.79 14.79 16.36 16.75 14.72 -1.97*** -1.57*** 0.06
hospital (km) [5.40] [4.11] [5.95] [6.03] [5.33]
Annual income 26.7 26.47 15.3 16.6 14.5 14.9 12.91 2.06 1.68 3.67**
(mil.LAK)c [53.40] [28.49] [22.50] [16.50] [25.20] [27.50] [11.44]
Standard errors are reported in brackets. M, N, EN are CBHI currently active members, non-members, ex- and non-members, respectively.
a SVK is Savannakhet Province where is our study area.
b Since only interval can be identified by experiment, S.E of the mean is not observed unless midpoints are used.
c Last 12 months reported (2015 price base).
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4 Empirical results
According to the measured risk parameters, the validity of the EUT
hypothesis is tested. The null hypothesis of α = λ = 1, with the condition
that the prospect value function would transform to the conventional EUT,
is rejected at 1% confidence interval, thus showing strong evidence that the
means of the observed and are significantly different from one. The result
suggests that a substantial number of samples behave in a coherent pattern
with the PT.
We next examine the linkages between households decisions to enroll
in the CBHI scheme and their risk preferences. In addition to the full sample,
we estimate separate models for the two subsamples. Subsample 1 is our
interest in which the CBHI ex-members are removed from the regression.
However, for a comprehensive insight into any significant differences between
CBHI members and ex-members, we intentionally include subsample 2 in
the analysis. As a sensitivity confirmation, we report the results from four
different specifications for all models.
The hypothesis that risk-averse subjects are more likely to engage in
the CBHI scheme is confirmed with two main findings in this study. The
regression results are summarized in Table 3. Among the three elicited
risk parameters of PT (risk aversion for gains, risk aversion for probability
prospects, and loss aversion), the risk aversion for probability prospects ap-
pears to be the strongest behavioral predictor. The estimates are positive
and significant at 5% level in the full sample, but at 10% level in subsam-
ple 1. The results are robust, even upon considering the demographic and
economic confounders. The findings imply that subjects who are less risk-
seeking in moderate- or high-probabilities of losses are more likely to favor
the CBHI scheme. Furthermore, weak evidence on the correlation between
the loss aversion and the CBHI scheme uptake likelihood are found in sub-
sample 1 when household heads education, household size, agriculture land,
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and distance to the district hospital are controlled in the regression. More
specifically, there is a growing probability to engage in the CBHI scheme
since subjects are more loss-averse.
Additionally, the association between many demographic variables
and the likelihood of scheme enrollment is statistically significant and has
expected signs throughout all specifications. Like the common findings in
previous literature (Ito & Kono, 2010; Alkenbrack & Lindelow, 2015), house-
holds with educated and older household heads and larger sizes are associ-
ated with an increased probability for the CBHI scheme uptake decision.
Furthermore, what can be captured from subsample 2 is that the
risk aversion for gains is positively correlated with the likelihood of scheme
uptake decisions. In other words, the subjects who are relatively less risk-
averse are likely to enroll, and those who are more risk-averse tend to drop
out of the scheme. This finding might imply that because the ex-members
are more risk-averse, they therefore enrolled in the CBHI scheme in the
first place in order to reduce the risks of unexpected catastrophic healthcare
expenditures. However, once enrolled, they might find that they rarely used
the healthcare services or the benefits did not meet their expectations, and
then they dropped out of the scheme.
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Table 3: Risk preferences and the CBHI scheme uptake
Variables Full sample (580) Subsample 1 (508)a Subsample 2 (282)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
σ (risk aversion for 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.303 ** 0.305 ** 0.311 ** 0.313 **
gains) [0.23] [0.26] [0.36] [0.36] [0.5] [0.54] [0.79] [0.8] [0.15] [0.15] [0.15] [0.15]
α (risk aversion for 0.33 ** 0.33 ** 0.35 ** 0.35 ** 0.33 * 0.32 * 0.33 * 0.33 * 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34
probability
prospects)
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.24] [0.24] [0.25] [0.25]
λ (loss aversion) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 * 0.03 * 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.32] [0.3] [0.13] [0.13] [0.3] [0.27] [0.07] [0.07] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Household head -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.008 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11
gender (1=male) [0.92] [0.71] [0.71] [0.99] [0.96] [0.96] [0.23] [0.25] [0.25]
Household head age 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.008 * 0.01 0.01 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006
[0.12] [0.29] [0.3] [0.05] [0.1] [0.1] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Household head 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.002 0.0005
education [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Household size 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.08 * 0.08 *
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.04]
Agriculture area
(m2)
0.0000009 -0.0000004 -0.00009
[0.000003] [0.000003] [0.00005]
Distance to district -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.0002 -0.006
hospital (km) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.0019] [0.0019]
Constant -0.73 *** -0.02 *** -1.11 *** -1.12 *** -0.56 *** -0.97 *** -1.04 *** -1.04 *** 0.15 0.3 0.04 0.06
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.26] [0.49] [0.57] [0.57]
The numbers in the brackets are standard deviations.
a Subsample 1: sample includes CBHI members and non-members.
Subsample 2: sample includes CBHI members and ex-members.
5 Conclusion
It is well known that health insurance reduces the risks of unexpected
catastrophic health expenditures. Thus, individuals with either high risk
aversion or loss aversion are expected to favor the insurance. Although there
have already been many studies examining the links between individual-
specific risk preferences and their decisions to buy health insurance, evidence
varies by country, health insurance setting, and the method used to measure
risk preferences. Especially with respect to the risk preference measurement,
some studies employ self-reported questionnaires or lottery choice experi-
ments with hypothetical rewards (Lammers & Warmerdam, 2010; Pierre
& Jusot, 2017), which do not always reflect the real attitudes of subjects.
Conversely, some other studies conduct risk experiments with real money
at stake, but the experimental design forces the researchers to establish
prior assumptions on the theory of decision-making under uncertainty for
the subjects, especially under either EUT (Alkenbrack & Lindelow, 2015) or
PT (Ito & Kono, 2010). Unlike the previous literature, this study employs
the risk elicitation experiment technique of Tanaka et al. (2010), in which
the validity of the EUT and PT assumptions can be tested simultaneously.
We then relate the measured risk parameters to examine the association be-
tween individual risk preferences and the probability of opting for the CBHI
scheme in rural villages of Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR.
The findings suggest that a substantial number of samples illustrate
risk preferences that support the hypothesis of PT. Subjects are likely to be
risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses. For empirical analysis,
the results suggest robust evidence that individuals who are less risk-seeking
for moderate- or high-probabilities of losses tend to participate in the CBHI
scheme. However, once the ex-members are excluded from the regression,
we find additional significant but weak evidence on the association between
loss aversion and the scheme uptake decisions. Furthermore, we find that
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high risk aversion for gains is affiliated with the CBHI scheme dropout.
Despite high risk aversion, why did ex-members drop out of the scheme?
Further study on the stated preferences for their expected CBHI scheme
merits future study, especially to determine whether the benefit package of
the current CBHI scheme is a reason leading to the dropout. The significant
correlation of the behavioral predictors with the likelihood of CBHI scheme
enrollment shows that the decision to engage in the CBHI scheme for rural
households in Lao PDR is not completely rational in exogenous predictors.
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Notes
1See Sebora and Cornwell (1995).
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2In prospect theory, each probability pi for receiving the separate outcome xi is trans-
formed to the probability weighting function p (pi).
3If σ < 1, σ = 1, or 0 < σ < 1, the subject is considered to be risk-seeking, risk-neutral,
or risk-averse, respectively.
4The theory expects the results of loss neutrality (λ = 1) or loss aversion (λ > 1), but
not loss seeking (λ < 1).
5The function would be linear if α = 1, but it would be S-shaped and inverted S-
shaped if α > 1 and 0 < α < 1, respectively. The inverted-S shape of probability weighting
function favors risk-seeking and risk-averse preferences for small-probability and moderate-
or high-probability prospects of losses, respectively (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). As
stated in the study of Gonzalez and Wu (1999), probabilities below 30% are treated as
small-probabilities.
6The risk attitude towards gains would be entirely explained by the value function in
the case that the probability weighting function for gains is linear. By the same token,
the risk attitude for gains is wholly defined by the probability weighting function for gains
if the value function is linear for gains.
7We exclusively identify either the household head or spouse as the representative of
the household for the experiment. In the local context, the household head or spouse is
the key decision maker over the allocation of economic resources within the household.
Their risk preferences may be crucially relevant with the decision making of the entire
household.
8We thank to Professor Shinji KANEKO for his insightful comment on this assumption.
9The value of stakes is tailored to be consistent with the income level of rural people
in Lao PDR.
10Due to the assumption of subjects rationality, monotonic switching is enforced in this
experiment.
11The average payoff of the experiment is 22,000LAK, or about 70% of a single days
wage of unskilled worker. 1USD ≈ 8,200LAK in September 2016.
12Once a subject completed all the given decisions, he/she also took part in another
time discounting preference experiment which is the subject of a separate article related
to our CBHI scheme study in Lao PDR.
13The expected payoff difference means the maximum amount of money that the subject
is willing to give up in exchange for the allocation with certainty. Note that the subjects
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in the experiment were not given the payoff difference column. Prior to conducting the
experiment, all subjects were asked whether they still wanted to be involved in the ex-
periment in which they might face the possibility of a financial loss of their own money
(but not a big amount). Fortunately, all participants were willing to take part in the
experimental session.
14See Nguyen et al. (2010) for the detailed sample of the risk parameter measurement.
15Note that non-members and ex-members are not distinguished.
16However, CBHI coverage in the Champhone and Xaibouly Districts accounted for
only 0.21% and 0.1% of the provincial population in 2015, respectively.
17The Lao Statistics Bureau classifies villages into three types. Village type I indicates
an urban village with road access, electricity, water supply, a regular market, and admin-
istrative office; Village type II is a rural village with road access; and Village type III is a
rural village without road access. For example, the “1 1 0 1 1 1 0” condition indicates
road access (have), electricity (have), health care facility (no), clean water (have), village
drug kits (have), primary school (have), and regular market (no).
18The main survey was conducted on 13-27 September 2016 over the course of two days
per village, on average. The participants were recruited and gathered with the assistance
of the chiefs of the visited villages.
19We exclusively identify the household head or spouse as a representative of the house-
hold in the experiment. In the local context, the household head or spouse is the key
decision-maker over the allocation of economic resources within the household. Exploring
their preferences might result in acceptable and successful health insurance intervention
in the future. However, only 88.45% of respondents are household heads or spouses.
20Apart from the risk experiment, we concurrently conducted a time experiment with
real money rewards. Its results will be reported in a separate article, but the costs men-
tioned above are those of the risk experiment alone.
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